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We present a flexible quantum-key-distribution-based protocol for quantum private queries. Sim-
ilar to M. Jakobi et al’s protocol [Phys. Rev. A 83, 022301 (2011)], it is loss tolerant, practical and
robust against quantum memory attack. Furthermore, our protocol is more flexible and control-
lable. We show that, by adjusting the value of θ, the average number of the key bits Alice obtains
can be located on any fixed value the users wanted for any database size. And the parameter k is
generally smaller (even k = 1 can be achieved) when θ < pi/4, which implies lower complexity of
both quantum and classical communications. Furthermore, the users can choose a smaller θ to get
better database security, or a larger θ to obtain a lower probability with which Bob can correctly
guess the address of Alice’s query.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the approach to protect data secrecy
in public environment. As we know, the security of most
classical cryptosystems is based on the assumption of
computational complexity and might be susceptible to
the strong ability of quantum computation [1, 2]. Fortu-
nately, this difficulty can be overcome by quantum cryp-
tography [3, 4], where the security is assured by physical
principles. With the advantage of higher security, quan-
tum cryptography has attracted a great deal of attention
now.
In some cryptographic communications, we need not
only protect the security of the transmitted message
against eavesdropping from an outside adversary, but
also the communicators’ individual privacy against each
other. Private information retrieval (PIR) [5] and sym-
metrically private information retrieval (SPIR) [6] are
protocols for such circumstance. Both of them deal
with the problem of private user queries to a database,
where Alice wants to obtain one item secretly from Bob’s
database. Generally it is assumed that Alice knows the
address of this item in the database and, for simplicity,
the content of it is just a bit. In a PIR protocol the aim
is that Alice gets the item she wanted correctly and, at
the same time, Bob does not know which item Alice has
obtained. SPIR protects not only Alice’s privacy but also
the security of Bob’s database, that is, Alice cannot get
other items except the one she wanted in the database.
However, the task of SPIR cannot be implemented ide-
ally [7]. More practically, it is generally required that
Alice can elicit sufficiently little content of the database,
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or at least cannot get the whole database by dishonest
operations.
Quantum Private Queries (QPQ) is the quantum
scheme for SPIR problem. In 2008 V. Giovannetti et
al proposed the first QPQ protocol (GLM protocol) [8],
where the database is represented by a unitary opera-
tion (i.e. oracle operation) and it is performed on the
coming query states. In this protocol two query states
are needed. One is for getting the wanted information
from the database and the other, a superposition state,
for checking potential attack from Bob. GLM protocol is
cheat sensitive for Alice’s privacy: if Bob tries to obtain
information on the query he would be discovered by Alice
with a certain probability. It ensures perfect data privacy
of the database: Alice can obtain at most two items if
she perform dishonest queries. Compared with previous
schemes GLM protocol displays an exponential reduc-
tion in both communication complexity and running-time
computational complexity. Furthermore, the security of
GLM protocol was deeply analyzed [9] and a proof-of-
principle experimental realization of it was implemented
[10].
Recently L. Olejnik presented a quantum PIR proto-
col (O-protocol) [11], which is similar to GLM protocol
in terms of form. In this protocol the oracle operation
and the coding method are subtly selected so that one
query state can achieve two aims simultaneously, i.e. ob-
taining the expected information and checking Bob’s po-
tential attack. Here Alice’s checking is not a real-time
one (like that in GLM protocol) because only one query
is executed, but Bob’s answer may be wrong if he tries
to obtain Alice’s privacy, which will leave the trace of his
attack and be discovered by Alice later. Moreover, O-
protocol can reduce communication complexity further.
Though the above two protocols exhibit significant ad-
vantages in theory, they are difficult to implement be-
cause when large database is concerned the dimension
of the oracle operation will be very high. To solve this
2problem, M. Jakobi et al gave a new QPQ protocol (J-
protocol) based on quantum key distribution (QKD) [12],
which is the first practical QPQ protocol and quite dif-
ferent from the previous ones. In this protocol SARG04
QKD protocol [13] is utilized to distribute asymmetric
key between Alice and Bob, and the whole database is
encrypted by the key. Because Alice only knows some
bits of the key, she can obtain limited items in the
database. Compared with GLM protocol and O-protocol,
J-protocol can be easily generalized to large database and
it is loss tolerant. Furthermore, it is difficult for Bob to
obtain the address of Alice’s query even though he tries
his best to attack. In this sense, Alice’s privacy is pro-
tected better in J-protocol. Therefore, this new model of
QPQ, i.e. QKD-based QPQ, is very attractive and will
become a studying point in the future.
In this paper, inspired by the work of M. Jakobi et al
[12], we propose a new QPQ protocol based on QKD,
which can be seen as a generalization of J-protocol. We
show that our protocol preserves all the features of J-
protocol and is more flexible. In particular, by adjust-
ing the parameters the expected value of the key bits
Alice obtains can be located on a certain number for
databases of any size. And it also displays the advantages
of lower communication complexity and higher security
degree when suitable parameters are selected.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec.
II we describe our protocol in detail and show its features
especially on the flexibility. The security of our protocol
is analyzed in Sec. III and Sec.IV is our conclusion.
II. QPQ PROTOCOL BASED ON QKD
Without loss of generality, suppose there are N items
in Bob’s database, and Alice has bought one of them and
wants to obtain it secretly. The two users can execute the
following protocol.
A. The protocol
(1) Bob prepares a long sequence of photons which
are randomly in one of the states {|0〉, |1〉, |0′〉, |1′〉}, and
sends them to Alice. Here
|0′〉 = cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉,
|1′〉 = sin θ|0〉 − cos θ|1〉, (1)
and |0〉 and |1〉 represent bit 0, while |0′〉 and |1′〉 code for
bit 1. The parameter θ ∈ (0, pi/2) can be selected contin-
uously according to particular situations, which will be
demonstrated below.
(2) Alice randomly measures each received photon in
the basis B = {|0〉, |1〉} or the basis B′ = {|0′〉, |1′〉}.
Obviously this measurement does not allow her to infer
the value of the bit sent by Bob.
(3) Alice announces in which instances she has suc-
cessfully detected the qubit. The bits carried by the lost
photons are disregarded. Note that Alice cannot cheat by
lying in this step (e.g. announcing a photon lost when she
gets an unwanted measurement result). This is because
till now Alice has no information about the sent bits and
she cannot obtain any benefit by such a lie. Therefore,
this protocol is completely loss tolerant, which is similar
to that in J-protocol.
(4) For each qubit that Alice has successfully mea-
sured, Bob announces one bit 0 or 1, where 0 represents
this qubit is originally in the state |0〉 or |0′〉, while 1
implies the qubit is |1〉 or |1′〉.
(5) Alice interprets her measurement results in step 2.
According to her measurement result and Bob’s declara-
tion, Alice can obtain the sent bit with a certain probabil-
ity. This process is similar to that in B92 QKD protocol
[14]. For example, if Bob’s declaration is 0 and Alice’s
measurement result is |1〉 (|1′〉), she knows the qubit must
be in the state |0′〉 (|0〉) before the measurement and then
the sent bit is 1 (0). As a result, with Bob’s declaration
in step 4, Alice’s measurements will yield p = sin2 θ/2 of
conclusive results and 1 − p of inconclusive ones. Both
conclusive and inconclusive results are stored. by this
way Alice and Bob now share a raw key Kr which is
known completely to Bob and partly to Alice (she knows
p = sin2 θ/2 of the whole).
(6) Two users execute postprocessing to the key so that
Alice’s known bits in the key are reduced to 1 bit or a lit-
tle more. Without loss of generality, suppose the length
of the raw key shared between Alice and Bob is kN . Here
the natural number k is a parameter and we will discuss
its value later. Alice and Bob cut the raw key into k
substrings of length N , and add these k strings bitwise,
obtaining the final key K with length N . This process is
the same as that in J-protocol (please see Fig.1 in Ref.
[12]). Till now, Bob knows the whole key K and Alice
generally knows only several bits in it. But if Alice is
left with no known bit after this step, the protocol has
to be restarted. As we will show later, if suitable pa-
rameters are selected this event happens only with small
probability.
(7) Bob encrypts his database and Alice obtains the
item she wanted with one of her known bits in K. In
particular, suppose Alice knows the jth bit Kj and wants
the ith item (bit) of the database Xi. She declares the
number s = j− i. Then Bob shifts K by s and using the
obtained key K ′ to encrypt his database in the manner
of one-time pad. Thus Xi is encrypted by Kj and conse-
quently can be correctly obtained by Alice when she gets
the encrypted database.
B. The features of our protocol
It is not difficult to see that our protocol is actually
a generalization of J-protocol. When θ = pi/4 our pro-
tocol becomes J-protocol, where the carrier states are
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} [15].
Therefore, the features of J-protocol are still hold in ours.
3Furthermore, because θ can be selected continuously in
(0, pi/2) our protocol is more flexible and even exhibits
advantages in communication complexity and security.
In the following, by making the comparison to J-protocol,
we discuss the features of our protocol.
On the one hand, our protocol has the same features
as J-protocol in the following aspects.
(1) Different from BB84-based QPQ [12], our protocol
can stand against the quantum memory attack by Al-
ice. If Alice stores a received photon and measures it
after Bob’s declaration in step 4, she cannot obtain this
bit because she still has to discriminate nonorthogonal
states.
(2) Our protocol is loss tolerant. As discussed above,
Alice has no need to tell a lie on whether one photon
is lost (especially saying that a photon she has received
disappeared) because before Bob’s declaration she cannot
get any information about the corresponding bit. Note
that after Bob’s declaration Alice’s measurement is just
like that in B92 protocol [14]. We can also directly use
B92 protocol to perform QPQ (i.e. the carrier qubit is
randomly in two states, |0〉 or |0′〉), where Bob’s decla-
ration is not necessary anymore. But in this condition
Alice will obtain some information about the sent bit af-
ter her measurement. To elicit more bits in the raw key,
for example, Alice lies that the photon on which she gets
a inconclusive result is lost. So, the B92-based QPQ is
not so robust against channel-loss attack.
(3) Our protocol is practical and can be easily gener-
alized to huge-database condition. This is because Alice
and Bob just execute a simple QKD protocol and no
high-dimension oracle operation [8, 11] is needed.
On the other hand, our protocol has some peculiar
merits. The primary one is its flexibility.
As in J-protocol, after adding the substrings in step 6,
Alice will on average know n¯ = Npk (p = sin2 θ/2) bits
of the final key K, where the number n follows approxi-
mately a Poisson distribution. And the probability that
she does not know any bits at all and that the protocol
must be restarted is P0 = (1 − p
k)N . Now let us see
what will happens when θ < pi/4. Without loss of gener-
ality, suppose p = sin2 θ/2 = 0.15. In this condition we
can ensure both n¯ ≪ N and small P0, which implies a
successful execution of QPQ [12], by choosing an appro-
priate value of k (see Table I). It can be seen that fewer
substrings (i.e. a smaller k) are needed than that in J-
protocol, which means the number of transmitted qubits
are reduced. For example, when N=50000 only 5 sub-
strings are needed, while in J-protocol k is 7 to achieve
similar n¯ and P0. Thus at least 2N = 10
5 qubits (not
including the lost ones in the channel) are saved in our
protocol. In fact, in our protocol k = 1 is even feasi-
ble for not so large database size N (see Tables II and
III). This is obviously a significant improvement with the
comparison to J-protocol. Note that the condition k = 1
will not compromise the cheat-sensitive character of the
QPQ protocol, which we will discuss in the next section.
Furthermore, in our protocol the average number of
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FIG. 1. How to achieve n¯ = 3 for any N . Similar result also
exists when we pursue n¯ other than 3.
the key bits Alice obtains n¯ can be located on any fixed
value the users wanted for any database size N . Let us
recall the results in J-protocol first (see Table I in Ref.
[12], which is similar to Table I here). When N = 50000
we have almost no choice but letting k = 7 and n¯ = 3.05
in J-protocol. This is because n¯ will be 12.21 if k = 6
and 0.76 (P0 = 0.466) if k = 8, which are not so suitable
for the aim of QPQ. The similar result exists for other
N . But in our protocol the condition will be changed.
By selecting different values of θ we can set n¯ equals an
expected value for anyN . Tables II and III are the results
with k = 1 when the wanted n¯ is 3 and 5, respectively.
It can be see that if we pursue k = 1, which means the
optimal communication complexity in our protocol, θ will
be very small for largeN . This might make its realization
technically difficult. Therefore, k > 1 is needed when N
is large. In this condition we can also locate n¯ on an
expected value for any N by selecting suitable θ and k.
For example, even though θ > 0.2 is required we can also
achieve n¯ = 3 for any N by simply adjusting k (see Table
IV).
Fig. 1, where we locate n¯ = 3, is a general illustration
about the flexibility of our protocol. It is shown that, we
can achieve n¯ = 3 by simply selecting a relatively small
θ, as long as it is feasible in the realization, and a suitable
k for any N .
In fact, except for the above example for n¯ = 3, n¯ can
be set on any expected number smaller than N in our
protocol. Sometimes we may want that Alice obtains
key bits a litter more. On the one hand, as pointed in
Ref. [12], Alice can use some key bits to get some other
items in the database and then use them to detect Bob’s
potential attack. On the other hand, two users can also
TABLE I. Example of possible choice of k and the values P0
and n¯ for different database sizes N (p = 0.15).
N 103 5× 103 104 5× 104 105 106
k 3 4 4 5 5 6
n¯ 3.38 2.53 5.06 3.79 7.59 11.39
P0 0.034 0.080 0.006 0.022 5× 10
−4 10−5
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FIG. 2. Any n¯≪ N can be achieved for N = 10000.
compare some key bits publicly (as in BB84) to check the
error rate in the key. Obviously in a practical QPQ pro-
tocol Alice’s final key bits may be different from Bob’s,
which is caused by an outside eavesdropper’s attack or
channel noise. Now we still have no effective way to per-
form error correction or privacy amplification to achieve
high correctness of the final key in such a special QKD
protocol (that is, Alice only gets parts of the whole key
and Bob does not know which bits are obtained by Al-
ice). Though the above comparison cannot ensure Alice’s
key bit, corresponding to the item she wants, is determi-
nately the same as Bob’s one, the error rate still implies
the correctness of the shared key bit to some extent. For
example, if the error rate is 1/10 Alice knows the key bit,
which will be used to get the wanted item in the database,
equals to Bob’s with a high probability. On the contrary,
if the error rate is higher than a threshold she will discard
this result. Fig. 2 shows that in our protocol different n¯
can be achieved for a fixed N by adjusting θ and k.
Furthermore, our protocol also saves classical commu-
nication. In our protocol Bob only needs to send 1 bit,
i.e. 0 or 1, to Alice for a qubit in step 4, while 2 bits are
needed in J-protocol. In addition, our protocol exhibits
some advantages in security, which will be demonstrated
in the next section.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Now we consider the security of our protocol. Be-
cause it is actually a generalization of J-protocol, where
θ = pi/4, the analysis in Ref. [12] can be adapted here
TABLE II. For different N , θ can be selected so that k = 1
and n¯ = 3.
N 12 50 100 200 500 1000 5000
p 0.25 0.06 0.03 0.015 0.006 0.003 6×10−4
P0 0.032 0.045 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050
θ 0.785(pi
4
) 0.354 0.247 0.174 0.110 0.078 0.035
directly. It is not difficult to imagine that our protocol
can also ensure the security of the database and the pri-
vacy of the user. In the following we focus on how the
security degree changes when θ 6= pi/4 in our protocol.
A. Database security
If Alice is dishonest and she wants to obtain more items
in Bob’s database, she has to try to obtain more key bits
in the raw key Kr. To this aim Alice can store the qubits
received from Bob and take more effective measurements
on them after Bob’s declaration in step 4.
Let us consider the simple measurement for Alice first,
i.e. individual one for each qubit she received. For exam-
ple, if Bob said a qubit is in one of the states {|0〉, |0′〉}
by declaring 0, Alice performs the optimal unambigu-
ous state discrimination (USD) measurement [16, 17]
to distinguish which state the qubit is in. The suc-
cess probability of this USD measurement is bounded
by 1 − F (ρ0, ρ1), where F (ρ0, ρ1) is the fidelity between
the two states to be discriminated. So in our protocol
this probability is pUSD = 1 − 〈0|0′〉 = 1 − cos θ. It
can be seen that, the advantage Alice obtains by USD
measurement is negligible compared with the legal pro-
jective one, where the probability is p = sin2 θ/2, espe-
cially when θ is small (see Fig. 3). For example, when
θ = 0.284, N = 50000 and k = 3 (see Table IV), Al-
ice can get n¯USD = 50000 × (1 − cos 0.284)3 = 3.21
bits of the key by USD measurement, which is just a
little more than the value by projective one, i.e. n¯ =
50000×[(sin0.284)2/2]3 = 3.02. Note that this implies an
improvement compared to J-protocol, where n¯USD = 9.3
in the same situation, i.e. pursuing n¯ = 3.
As analyzed in Ref. [12], Alice can also perform joint
measurement on the k qubits which contribute to an el-
ement of the final key. By this means she wants to ob-
tain the bit value of the final key directly without dis-
tinguishing the individual bit values of the raw key. In
this condition two kinds of measurements can be used
by Alice. One is Helstrom’s minimal error-probability
measurement, i.e., the measurement that distinguishes
two quantum states with the highest information gain
[18, 19]. To distinguish two equally likely quantum states
ρ0 and ρ1, the probability to guess the state correctly is
bounded by pguess =
1
2
+ 1
2
D(ρ0, ρ1), where D(ρ0, ρ1) is
the trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1. In our protocol,
therefore, Alice can correctly guess a final key bit with
the probability at most pguess =
1
2
+ 1
2
sink θ. Obviously
TABLE III. For different N , θ can be selected so that k = 1
and n¯ = 5.
N 20 50 100 200 500 1000 5000
p 0.25 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005 0.001
P0 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
θ 0.785(pi
4
) 0.464 0.322 0.226 0.142 0.100 0.045
50.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Θ
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FIG. 3. Comparison between Alice’s success probability by
USD measurement and projective one on a qubit. The dashed
line represents the result for USD measurement and the solid
line is for projective one.
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FIG. 4. Alice’s success probabilities to obtain the final key
bits by joint USD measurement for different θ. Among them
the line denoted as θ = pi/4 is the result of J-protocol. It
can be seen that when θ is small, Alice will get less bits in
the final key, which implies a higher security degree for the
database under this kind of attack.
when θ is small this probability is close to 1/2 (a random
guess). The other measurement Alice can use is USD
measurement. In this condition the success probability
of unambiguously discriminating the two k-qubit mixed
states corresponding to odd and even parity can be ob-
tained, which declines rapidly with k (see Fig. 4). In
Fig. 4 the probabilities that Alice can get the final key
bits by joint USD are depicted for different values of θ,
where we can see that when θ is small Alice’s advantage
by joint USD is distinctly decreased.
To sum up, if θ < pi/4 is chosen in our protocol it
exhibits an obvious improvement compared to J-protocol
in terms of the database security.
TABLE IV. For different N , θ (> 0.2) can be selected so that
n¯ = 3 and P0 ≈ 0.05.
N 103 5× 103 104 5× 104 105 106
k 2 2 3 3 3 4
θ 0.337 0.223 0.375 0.284 0.252 0.293
B. User privacy
In QPQ protocols, the user privacy is pursued in the
manner of cheat-sensitive [8, 11, 12]. That is, Bob will
run the risk of being discovered if he tries to obtain the
address queried by Alice. In GLM protocol such a dishon-
est Bob will inevitably send unsatisfied answer to Alice
and then be discovered with a certain probability. While
in O-protocol and J-protocol dishonest Bob might send
wrong answer to Alice, which will also be detected by
Alice at a later time.
Our protocol is also cheat sensitive for user privacy
in the sense that Bob cannot simultaneously obtain the
query address and give right answer for the query deter-
ministically. The reason is the same as that in Ref.[12]. If
dishonest Bob, by sending fake states or performing spe-
cial measurements, can get both the conclusiveness of one
of Alice’s elements of the raw key and the corresponding
value of this key bit, he knows the exact measurement ba-
sis chosen by Alice. Thus, Bob knows Alice’s choice once
she measured the qubit randomly in one of two bases,
which implies superluminal communication. Therefore,
the security of user privacy in our protocol is assured by
the no-signaling principle.
In the following we briefly discuss the probability with
which Bob can obtain the conclusiveness of any of Alice’s
bits in the raw key, and demonstrate the relation between
this probability and the value of θ. Similar to the analysis
in Ref. [12], Bob can get the conclusiveness of Alice’s one
bit with the optimal probability by sending |0′′〉 (|1′′〉)
and announcing 1 (0) in step 4. Here
|0′′〉 = cos(θ/2)|0〉+ sin(θ/2)|1〉,
|1′′〉 = sin(θ/2)|0〉 − cos(θ/2)|1〉. (2)
Thus Bob knows that Alice will get conclusive result on
this qubit with the probability pc = cos
2(θ/2). If Bob
expects that Alice gets inconclusive result on one qubit,
he just sends |0′′〉 (|1′′〉) and announcing 0 (1) in step
4. By this method the probability with which Alice gets
conclusive result equals pi = 1 − pc = sin
2(θ/2). Fig. 5
demonstrates the relation between pc and θ. It can be
seen that a smaller θ implies a higher probability with
which Bob can predict Alice’s conclusive bits. As ana-
lyzed above, we are inclined to use a small θ ∈ (0, pi/4)
to achieve its advantages in communication complexity
and security degree of the database. In this condition
Bob generally can obtain the address of Alice’s query
with relatively higher probability. But this does not de-
crease Alice’s privacy in the sense that it is still cheat
sensitive. This is because Bob will inevitably lose the
knowledge about the value of the key bit when he tries
to obtain its conclusiveness, which is the same as that in
J-protocol. For example, in the above attack, Bob will
completely not know the value of the corresponding key
bit though he can optimally estimate the address of Al-
ice’s query. Consequently it is impossible for Bob to give
Alice a right answer with certainty. This is assured by
the no-signaling principle.
60.5 1.0 1.5 Θ
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
pc
FIG. 5. The relation between the probability pc, with which
Alice gets conclusive result, and the value of θ under Bob’s
attack. The dashed line denotes the result in J-protocol (i.e.
θ = pi/4).
Generally speaking, as pointed out in Sec.II, the users
can choose a suitable value of θ so that k = 1 in our
protocol, which means the optimal communication com-
plexity. Recalling the process in step 6, we know that it
is easier for Bob to guess the conclusiveness of one bit
in Alice’s final key when k is smaller. But this fact does
not hurt the security of this protocol when k = 1 be-
cause Bob will lose the value of the bit when he tries to
get its conclusiveness. Of course, a large θ (e.g. θ > pi/4)
can also be selected to achieve a small pc if we pursue a
low probability with which Bob can correctly guess the
address of Alice’s query (see Fig. 5). This exhibits the
flexibility of our protocol again.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We present a flexible QKD-based QPQ protocol, which
can be seen as a generalization of J-protocol [12]. It re-
tains all the features of J-protocol. For example, it is loss
tolerant, practical and robust against quantum memory
attack. Furthermore, our protocol is very flexible and
controllable. When a small θ (θ < pi/4) is used the aim
of QPQ can be achieved with a smaller k (even k = 1)
than that in J-protocol, which implies lower complexity
of both quantum and classical communications. In our
protocol, by adjusting the value of θ, the average number
of the key bits Alice obtains can be located on any fixed
value the users wanted for any database size N . In addi-
tion, when θ < pi/4 our protocol exhibits better database
security, which is ensured by the impossibility of per-
fectly distinguishing nonorthogonal quantum states. At
the same time, user privacy is ensured by the no-signaling
principle and, in some special conditions, θ > pi/4 can be
also selected to obtain a low probability with which Bob
can correctly guess the address of Alice’s query.
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